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Have monetary transmission mechanisms 
in Africa changed? 
Benedicte Vibe Christensen
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1. Introduction   
African countries generally performed very well economically from the early 2000s to 2008 – a 
prolonged period of record high growth of real GDP, a decline in the inflation rate to single 
digits in most countries, and increases in external reserves (Graph 1). The good performance 
was due partly to a prolonged upswing abroad, which also fuelled commodity prices (Graph 2), 
and partly to debt relief. But improved domestic policies also played an important role. The 
ability of African countries to weather exogenous shocks was demonstrated during the recent 
global financial crisis. While African countries typically have lagged cyclical upswings abroad, 
this time they have rebounded with other developing countries. To be sure, greater integration 
with rapidly growing economies in Asia played a role, but the rebound has also been due to the 
pursuit of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies in many African countries.  
This note discusses how monetary policy was conducted in Africa during the global financial 
crisis and whether there were any indications that the transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy had changed – a development seen in emerging markets in other regions. It also 
examines the lessons from the crisis and asks how African central banks should manage 
monetary policy in response to exogenous shocks – from both trade and capital flows – as 
the continent attains greater integration in the global economy.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some general economic conditions 
required for the conduct of effective monetary policy and notes four specific features of 
African economies that constrain policy effectiveness: low financial depth; widespread 
dollarisation; fiscal dominance; and the so-called excess liquidity of the banking systems. 
Section 3 reviews the main monetary policy frameworks currently in place in Africa. Section 4 
discusses the conduct of monetary policy in Africa during the global financial crisis and in 
particular the performance of the different transmission channels of monetary policy during 
the crisis. Section 5 summarises the main findings of the paper. 
2.  Conditions for effective monetary policy 
The effective transmission of monetary policy requires several conditions: The independence 
and credibility of the central bank must influence not only the formulation of monetary policy 
but also public expectations as to the effectiveness of such policy. Transmission 
mechanisms based on interest rates are better than direct controls on bank credit; a system 
based on large reserve requirements can be seen as part of the transition away from direct 
controls to reliance on interest rates. Well functioning secondary markets help the central 
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bank influence the value of financial market variables such as the interbank market interest 
rate and the money stock (Mishra et al (2010)). Competition in the banking sector is 
necessary if changes in the policy rates are to have an impact on market rates; banks in a 
non-competitive market might not pass-on changes in policy rates to the lending or deposits 
rates of customers. The existence of long-term bonds is a prerequisite for the establishment 
of a market-based term structure; it also helps to hedge uncertainty about future short-term 
rates. Finally, a substantial degree of international financial integration is required to 
influence the arbitrage between domestic and foreign financial assets.  
 
Graph 1 
Macroeconomic indicators for Africa, by level of financial depth 
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1  In per cent.    
2  In billions of US dollars.    
3   Economies with relatively well developed financial markets that 
resemble those of emerging market economies (EMEs) in the rest of the world, consisting of five countries: 
Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Morocco and Tunisia.    
4  Economies whose financial markets are advancing but do 
not yet have the same access to global capital markets as EMEs, consisting of 12 countries: Botswana, Cape
Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zambia. The peak in GDP growth in 2002 was due to 21% growth in Nigeria.   
5  Economies with the least well 
developed financial markets, consisting of 36 countries.   
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
It is useful to examine first how monetary regimes have developed in emerging market 
economies (EMEs) in other regions of the world. In EMEs outside Africa, three broad trends 
can be discerned: first, a trend towards independent monetary policy regimes with greater 
emphasis on inflation control and inflation targeting; second, development of financial markets 
with less government intervention and reduced fiscal dominance; and third, greater economic 
(especially trade) and financial market integration with the global economy (BIS (2008)).  
Reflecting these developments, EMEs have built up significant gross foreign asset and 
liability positions, and correlations between asset prices in emerging markets and developed 
countries have strengthened. Together with the rapid development of EMEs, their greater 
integration into the global economy has strengthened the transmission mechanisms of 
monetary policy, including the interest rate channel. However, it has also made control more 
difficult in some cases, eg by making interest rates, capital flows, and exchange rates highly 
sensitive to external developments. 
In low-income countries, by contrast, one would expect the lack of developed financial 
markets to weaken the interest rate channel, and the lack of a secondary market for equities 
and real estate to weaken the asset channel. The exchange rate channel would depend on 
the actual flexibility of the exchange rate.  
In Africa, the monetary policy environment is gradually changing. The remainder of this 
section examines some specific features of African economies that have constrained the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in the past – the level of financial depth, dollarisation, fiscal 
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1  Month-end data. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Financial depth 
Africa has trailed the rest of the world in terms of financial development. Apart from a few 
countries, most notably South Africa, the continent has been characterised by less 
developed financial markets, limited competition in the banking sector and few non-bank 
financial institutions. Long-term financing, which is critical for infrastructure investment, has 
been virtually non-existent.  
Africa comprises a diverse group of 53 countries, and this paper considers them in three 
groups (see Table A1):
3 
  Emerging market economies, which have relatively well developed financial 
markets that resemble those of EMEs in the rest of the world. This group comprises 
five countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia.   
  Frontier market economies, whose financial markets are advancing but are yet to 
have the same access to global capital markets as EMEs. This group comprises 12 
countries – five middle-income countries: Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, 
Namibia and Seychelles; and seven low-income countries: Ghana, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.   
  Financially developing economies, which have the least well developed financial 
markets. This group comprises the remaining 36 countries, all of them low income. 
During the past decade, financial depth in Africa has increased, although not uniformly. 
Measured in terms of the ratio of banks’ liquid liabilities to GDP, it has increased in all three 
groups but particularly in the emerging and frontier market economies (Table 1). The 
measurement of financial depth should ideally also include liquid liabilities of bank-like 
institutions and non-bank financial institutions (eg microfinance institutions), but the data for 
this category are incomplete. Banks have also become more efficient in transformation of 
deposits to private sector credit except in the financially developing countries.  
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Indicators of financial depth  
Ratio, in per cent, weighted by country GDP 
Liquid liabilities to GDP
1  Private sector  
bank credit to deposits
2   
1998–2000 2008–10  1998–2000  2008–10 
Africa        
   Emerging market  48  63  93  96 
   Frontier market  18  34  73  88 
Financially developing   20  23  71  61 
Selected emerging 
market economies
3  39 50  87  92 
1  Liquid liabilities are currency plus demand deposits and interest bearing liabilities of banks.    
2  Bank credit to 
the private sector is taken from line 22d of the IFS data.    
3  Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
Financial depth indicators suggest that emerging and frontier market economies in Africa are 
approaching the average levels of comparator groups in other EME regions of the world. 
However, financially developing economies in Africa continue to lag in financial depth 
according to most commonly used measurements. In fact, they appear to have regressed 
during the global crisis, which might be due to high credit expansion before the crisis that 
turned out to be very risky in a recession setting. As a result, in many African countries, 
banks stepped on the brakes, and credit even declined in a few cases (see Section 4 below). 
Regarding integration with international capital markets, Africa compares relatively well with 
other developing country regions in terms of cross-border bank transactions (Graph 3, left-
hand panel). However, it lags behind in terms of issuance of international debt securities 
(Graph 3, right-hand panel). 
Graph 3 
International bank lending and issuance of international debt securities 
Amounts outstanding, as a percentage of GDP, September 2010 
International bank lending














1    External loans of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis all sectors in individual countries.   
2  International  debt 
securities, all issuers. 




Commercial banks’ assets and liabilities in foreign currency 
Share of total liabilities or assets, in per cent 
   2005  2010 
Botswana Liabilities  15.5  12.1 
 Assets  15.8  10.9 
Ghana Liabilities 27.4  28.5 
 Assets  24.5  23.0 
Kenya Liabilities  21.2
1 14.3 
 Assets  23.3
1 15.9 
Lesotho
2 Liabilities  2.7  1.4 
 Assets  31.7  47.2 
Madagascar Liabilities  24.5  20.5 
 Assets  20.9  19.0 
Mauritius Liabilities  52.0  60.0 
 Assets  57.0  62.0 
Morocco Liabilities  2.8  3.6 
 Assets  6.5  6.6 
Mozambique Liabilities 33.5  31.2 
 Assets  34.6  33.4 
South Africa  Liabilities  8.7  5.7 
 Assets  3.7  4.1 
Seychelles Liabilities  41.0  41.0 
 Assets  11.0  10.0 
Swaziland
2 Liabilities  0.0  0.2 
 Assets  3.1  5.9 
Tanzania Liabilities  33.2  26.6 
 Assets  30.9  27.9 
Tunisia Liabilities 11.3  14.0 
 Assets  9.5  11.6 
Uganda Liabilities  26.9  25.2 
 Assets  27.4  24.7 
Zambia Liabilities  2.1  5.6 
 Assets  20.7  14.9 
1  Refers to 2008, earliest figure available.   
2  Part of the rand area. 
Source: Central bank responses to BIS questionnaire. 
 
Dollarisation 
Monetary policy can affect financial claims and liabilities in local currencies but not in foreign 
currencies. The greater the dollarisation of an economy, the less scope there is for an 
independent monetary policy. Dollarisation or the use of foreign currencies might indicate 
that confidence in the stability of the local currency is lacking. A number of countries still 
have banking systems in which foreign currencies account for one fifth to one third of total 42  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
assets and liabilities (Table 2).
4 In most cases, the share of instruments denominated in 
foreign currency is similar on the asset and liability side, suggesting that there might not be a 
foreign exchange mismatch on the books of the banks (depending on the currency of 
denomination). However, lending in foreign currency for domestic purposes implies indirect 
currency mismatches because the customers of banks might face currency mismatches. 
Fiscal dominance 
Monetary policy in many African countries has suffered from fiscal dominance. Fiscal 
dominance implies that expectations about inflation are intrinsically linked to fiscal 
performance. Under fiscal dominance, for example, a monetary policy tightening might have 
a perverse effect on the economy. Instead of leading to an increase in real interest rates, 
appreciation of the currency, and reduction in aggregate demand and inflation, such 
tightening might fuel expectations of default on government debt and thereby lead to a 
depreciation of the currency and increase in inflation. Under fiscal dominance, inflation 
expectations react to fiscal events and reflect lack of a credible anchor. Fiscal dominance 
can also compromise central bank independence if the government openly resists moves by 
the central bank to raise interest rates. More importantly, fiscal dominance generally crowds 
out private sector credit. 
Graph 4 
Net claims on central governments as a share of reserve money 
In per cent 
Africa















































 1  Weighted by GDP. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
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Before the global financial crisis, fiscal dominance had been reduced in many countries, as 
illustrated by indicators of central bank credit to the government and banks’ claims on the 
government sector (mostly treasury bills) (Graphs 4 and 5). But it is also evident that some of 
this progress was reversed during the crisis, as some governments increased spending to 
cushion the effects of economic downturn. As economic growth picks up, governments might 
need to regain fiscal space through the pursuit of medium-term fiscal discipline. Otherwise, 
the effectiveness of monetary policies could become circumscribed in the future. 
Graph 5 
Claims on central government in per cent of claims on other sectors 
In per cent 
Africa















































1  Weighted by GDP. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Excess liquidity 
The effectiveness of monetary policy in Africa has often been hampered in the past by large 
pools of banking system liquidity in excess of required reserves (or required liquidity). The 
larger the liquid reserves on commercial bank balance sheets, the less sensitive the banks 
are to interest rate or reserve ratio increases and the stronger any central bank tightening 
measure must be to have the desired effect. 
Why have banks in Africa held such excess reserves, which are largely unremunerated, 
instead of making alternative placements? One reason is the lack of money market 
instruments in which banks can invest. A higher level of precautionary reserves might also 
reflect the fact that there is no effective interbank market in which banks can borrow if their 
reserve positions fall below the minimum. But the practice is also explained by the perceived 
lack of low-risk lending opportunities. In many African countries, weaknesses in property 
rights, poor enforceability of contracts, and lack of credit rating agencies have held banks 44  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
back from lending to the private sector.
5 It is also linked to controls on capital outflows.   
However, some changes have started to appear among these causes of excess liquidity. 
Since 2007, free reserves of the banking system have decreased markedly, thereby 
potentially making monetary policy more effective (Graph 6). In some countries this was 
brought about by an increase in the level of required reserves. This has improved the 
prospects that changes in policy rates of the central banks and changes in reserve money 
get passed through to private sector saving and lending, thereby possibly influencing real 
activity in the economy. However, this decline has not been uniform. In some countries, for 
instance in Madagascar, excess liquidity still hampers the transmission of monetary policy, 
as changes in policy rates are not passed on to interest rates in the banking system (Banque 
Centrale de Madagascar (2008)).  
Graph 6 
Banking sector reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa
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1   Total less required reserve deposits of the banking sector. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
In summary, the effectiveness of monetary policy in Africa has been enhanced over the past 
decade in countries where fiscal dominance and excess liquidity in the banking system have 
been reduced or eliminated and where financial depth has increased. In most African 
countries, and in particular the financially developing low-income countries, financial markets 
remain seriously underdeveloped, with limited bond markets and little or no supply of longer-
term securities. As discussed in Section 4, these structural weaknesses continue to 
undermine the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. To provide a background for 
that discussion, the next section briefly reviews the main monetary policy frameworks 
currently used in Africa. 
3. Monetary  policy  frameworks 
During the past decade, many countries have moved away from an exchange rate anchor 
towards greater exchange rate flexibility as a way of supporting external competitiveness 
(Table A1). In addition, the need to get inflation under control has led central banks to adopt 
intermediate targets such as monetary aggregates. But de facto, many African countries still 
pay attention to the exchange rate and try to limit its flexibility. Exchange rate anchors are 
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still used in the countries of the CFA zone and the rand zone (Common Monetary Area) and 
in a few other countries.
6  
In contrast to the trend in other emerging market economies, only three countries in Africa 
have adopted an inflation targeting (IT) framework so far: Mauritius, in a modified form, in 
1996; South Africa in 2002; and Ghana in 2007.  
Only South Africa has developed a fully fledged IT framework. Ghana’s framework is referred 
to as “IT lite”, which indicates that inflation targeting is the primary objective while exchange 
rate targeting is a secondary objective. Ghana was the first low-income country in the world 
to adopt the IT framework. The rationale for this approach is that the scope for monetary 
policy to be independent of external factors is limited in a small and highly open economy 
such as Ghana. Policy interest rates are set to place significant weight on the interest rate 
differential to the US federal funds rate, while reacting to domestic inflation when it is above 
the tolerance level. At the same time, foreign exchange intervention is limited to smoothing 
operations (IMF (2010b)). Similarly, Mauritius introduced a new framework for the conduct of 
monetary policy in 2004, in which the primary objective of the central bank is to maintain 
price stability and to promote orderly and balanced economic development (Bank of 
Mauritius (2006)).  
Among the four emerging economies in North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia use a range 
of monetary indicators to guide monetary policy within flexible or managed exchange rate 
systems, while Morocco has a pegged exchange rate. In Egypt and Morocco, the authorities 
have a medium-term goal of greater exchange rate flexibility within an inflation targeting 
framework.   
A number of countries with flexible exchange rate regimes have used reserve money 
targeting to guide monetary policy and provide a clear signal on the stance of monetary 
policy to the public. The basic rationale for this approach is that reserve money is within the 
control of the central bank. Indeed, reserve money targeting is still a hallmark of monetary 
policy in Africa, even though other developing countries have moved away from this 
operational target (IMF (2008)). Broad money is also often used as an intermediate target 
(Kasekende and Brownbridge (2010)). Reserve money targeting was appropriate when 
inflation was at high levels: studies show a strong relationship between inflation and changes 
in monetary aggregates when inflation is high (Thornton (2008) and Banque Centrale de 
Madagascar (2009)) and a weaker relationship at low levels of inflation. As inflation has been 
reduced in the majority of African economies, central banks – particularly in Africa’s frontier 
markets – are in the process of adapting their monetary policy framework so as to facilitate 
the achievement of objectives for output, prices and the exchange rate. This might call for a 
number of different intermediate targets.  
Most countries with fixed exchange rates have different challenges. The CFA franc zone 
– the largest fixed exchange rate zone in Africa – comprises 14 countries in two monetary 
unions: the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Although the two monetary unions have 
separate currencies, each is pegged to the euro at the same rate of exchange, which has not 
moved since 1994 (Gulde and Tsangarides (2008)). The monetary unions have been widely 
credited for the very low rate of inflation and macroeconomic stability in the region. But they 
have also faced challenges because the two regions are exposed to different exogenous 
shocks: all of CEMAC’s members are oil exporters except one, while all of WAEMU’s 
members are oil importers. In the absence of the exchange rate as an instrument, the 
adjustment in the real exchange rate is left to fiscal and structural policies, notably 
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adjustments in wages and prices. In addition, both regions face challenges in terms of 
regional conflicts, most recently in Ivory Coast (the largest economy in the WAEMU), which 
have impeded financial integration. Although the exchange rates in the two unions are fixed 
to the euro, the two central banks, BEAC and BCEAO, have some scope for pursuing 
monetary targets, given limited capital mobility and incomplete regional financial integration.  
Monetary policy instruments 
While African countries have made some progress in moving away from distortive regulatory 
instruments (eg credit ceilings, directed lending and interest rate controls), they still rely on a 
limited number of mainly direct instruments (Table 3). Market-based instruments include 
sales of foreign exchange and primary auctions of treasury bills, while interest rates play a 
secondary role in monetary targeting regimes. 
Table 3 
Primary instruments of monetary policy 


















suasion  Others 
Botswana              
Ghana             
Kenya              
Lesotho             
Madagascar              
Mauritius              
Morocco             
Mozambique             
South Africa              
Seychelles             
Swaziland             
Tanzania              
Tunisia             
Uganda             
Zambia              
Source: Central bank responses to BIS questionnaire. 
 
Effective reserve ratios for banks are relatively high in African countries. Reserve 
requirements might serve different purposes: as a monetary policy instrument; to reduce the 
cost of government deficit financing; and as a prudential tool. Changes in reserve ratios have 
in part been used to regulate liquidity in the banking system because of the lack of a 
functioning interbank money market. Even the market for treasury bills is often illiquid. This 
has limited the scope for open market operations of central banks. In some countries, 
reserve requirements are supplemented by a liquid asset requirement that is used as a 
monetary and prudential tool and is sometimes also motivated by the need to reduce the cost 
of deficit financing. Studies have generally found such tools ineffective and distortive for 
monetary policy purposes, although they might be effective for other purposes (Gulde 
(1995)). Since many central banks only partially remunerate required reserves, the reserves 
constitute a tax on banks and partly explain the large margin between deposit and lending 
rates in the banking system.   BIS Papers No 56  47
 
 
4.  Monetary policy during the global financial crisis 
For most of Africa, the global financial crisis did not involve insolvent banks or malign 
financial engineering but rather the impact of the global recession on export demand and 
commodity prices, tourism receipts, remittances and foreign direct investment. But for 
middle-income countries with stronger financial linkages to international capital markets 
– predictably – the effects of the crisis were also related to portfolio flows, and these 
countries were hit particularly hard.  
For instance, South Africa’s current account deficit ranked high among emerging market 
economies because of a low saving rate relative to its investment rate – the so-called “chink 
in the armour” (Reuters (2008)) – and tended to be financed by large portfolio inflows, which 
are more volatile than foreign direct investment flows. Indirectly, the impact on the South 
African banking system was also felt in other countries, as South African banks cut their 
lending to branches in other countries (World Bank (2010)). The South African banking 
sector was also affected by the sharp decline in equity prices during the crisis. The fall in 
equity prices had a further negative impact on private consumption via the wealth effect. 
Nigeria’s banking system was also affected by the crisis since the banks had expanded 
lending significantly in the years before the crisis and relied heavily on foreign financing. 
They were also engaged in margin lending for equity investments. With the sharp decline in 
equity prices, banks’ assets declined in tandem. Some banks also had sizeable off-balance 
sheet instruments that concealed nonperforming loans. In fact, it was a home-made problem 
accentuated by the global financial crisis. In the end, the Central Bank of Nigeria intervened 
in five banks in August 2009. Liquidity support amounted to about $2.8 billion (2½% of non-
oil GDP) (IMF (2009b)). Other countries where declines in local equities affected the banking 
sector were Kenya and Uganda.  
In Ghana, the crisis revealed weaknesses in selected banks (eg, loan concentration in the 
petroleum sector). Those weaknesses, as well as a slowdown in economic growth, 
weaknesses in banks’ risk management and losses by some state-owned energy 
enterprises, led to a sharp increase in nonperforming loans (IMF (2010b)).  
In the CFA franc zone, Benin and Togo experienced financial sector distress, which partly 
originated in the domestic economy but was accentuated by the global recession. 
While African banks are partly owned by foreign banks, these parent banks did not in most 
cases withdraw funds to a large extent. However, local banks nevertheless got into 
difficulties. In South Africa, some foreign-owned banks reduced their lending in order to avoid 
maturity mismatches on their balance sheets (South African Reserve Bank (2010)).   
African countries were generally spared from currency mismatches on the balance sheets of 
the government, banks and the private sector. As a result, currency valuation losses in the 
face of significant local currency depreciations were in general limited. Governments had 
benefitted from debt relief, which had reduced their foreign currency obligations. Moreover, 
only a few countries had begun to tap international capital markets (eg Gabon and Ghana). 
One should note in particular that several countries were on the verge of issuing international 
bonds when the crisis hit (eg Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia).  
Africa nevertheless suffered from the indirect effects of the crisis on the balance sheets of 
the banks. These effects included a drop in export demand and commodity prices and 
thereby also a decline in the quality of bank loan portfolios. In addition, interest rate spreads 
increased and the availability of foreign credit declined. Equity markets declined across the 
board in line with equity markets globally. Likewise, African currencies depreciated in line 
with developments in other emerging regions (Graph 7). And capital flowed out of the 
countries where foreign investors had been attracted by the high local currency yields 
(eg Ghana, Uganda and Zambia). 
During the recent crisis, African countries were generally in a stronger economic position in 
terms of fiscal and debt positions and inflation performance than during previous exogenous 48  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
shocks. This allowed the countries with flexible exchange rate regimes to pursue 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. However, food comprises a large share of the 
consumer price index. A rise in food prices could have therefore easily affected inflation 
expectations. On this occasion, central banks generally made the right call in judging that the 
pick-up in inflation was largely due to commodity price shocks and was therefore likely to be 
temporary provided there were no second-round effects on the rate of inflation. The central 
banks therefore shifted to easing monetary policy in line with the policies pursued in 
advanced economies. To dampen the impact on exchange rates, many central banks used 
their foreign exchange reserve cushions. If the circumstances had been different, eg if the 
commodity price increases had not been followed by the global recession, which took the 
wind out of inflation expectations, the policy response might well have been different. 
 
Graph 7 
Stock market indices and exchange rates 
for emerging and frontier market economies 

























African emerging and frontier markets
3
 
Note: Vertical line marks 15 September 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.  
1  Morgan Stanley Emerging Market Composite price index.    
2  2005 PPP weighted average of exchange rates for 
Brazil, India, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey.    
3  2005 PPP weighted average of exchange rates against US 
dollars for Egypt, Tunisia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Ghana, Seychelles, Uganda and Zambia. An increase
indicates appreciation of the local currency. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Against this background, the main issue was whether central banks shifted gears too late 
after the food price shock and eased liquidity and interest rates too late (or not by enough) to 
soften the impact of recession abroad on domestic growth. In fact, because inflation came 
down quickly in many countries, real interest rates might have increased (IMF (2010c)). 
Moreover, the build-up of liquidity in the banking system also reflected growing risk aversion, 
which might have called for monetary accommodation (eg in Zambia) (Baldini et al BIS Papers No 56  49
 
 
(forthcoming)). One important consideration for policymakers was therefore how long the 
exogenous shocks would last. This was more difficult to evaluate during the global financial 
crisis because, in addition to the multitude of channels by which external shocks affect policy, 
the risk premium on domestic assets increased as banks and investors became more risk 
averse during the global slowdown.  
The next section discusses in more detail how different monetary policy transmission 
channels have operated during the crisis. 
Transmission channels of monetary policy during the crisis 
Interest rate channel 
Policy rates were initially increased in many countries during 2008 in response to the 
inflationary threat from food price increases. However, as export demand, tourism, 
remittances and foreign direct investment weakened, central banks lowered policy rates. In 
responses to a BIS questionnaire, most central banks indicated that they attach high 
importance to this transmission channel (Table 4). Movements in policy rates are only 
effective to the extent they influence the deposit and lending rates of banks and thereby 
possibly economic activity.  
Table 4 
Monetary policy transmission mechanism 
















Botswana    0 0    
Ghana  5 1 4 3 2 
Kenya 5 3 4 5 3 
Lesotho    0    0 0 
Madagascar    0 0   0 
Mauritius  4 1 5 3 2 
Morocco  0 0 5 5 0 
Mozambique  5 0 0 0 0 
South  Africa  5 3 3 5 2 
Seychelles    0      0 
Swaziland  5 0 3 2 0 
Tanzania  3 0 1 2 0 
Tunisia  1 0 3 3 0 
Uganda        
Zambia  3 3 0 3 2 
Note: A tick indicates that only those channels are used, with no ranking given. 
Source: Central bank responses to BIS questionnaire. 
 
Although many central banks lowered their policy rates to reduce domestic interest rates and 
stimulate domestic activity (Graph 8), domestic rates often drifted upwards in response to 
rising global risk premiums. This happened in particular in countries with open capital 
accounts and a floating exchange rate system, thus negating the intended relaxation of 
monetary policy (IMF (2010a)). 50  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
An additional complication in assessing the interest rate channel is the importance of 
informal credit markets in Africa. For instance, tighter monetary policies may divert demand 
to the large informal credit sector and so lead to a sharp rise in the cost of credit (informal 
market rates may rise faster than formal market rates). Because demand effects may come 
with a considerable lag, tighter monetary policies may be associated with a short-run rise in 
cost-push inflation, with implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilise the 
economy. 
The transmission of interest rates varied among countries. In some cases, an oligopolistic 
market structure limits competition and allows banks to change profit margins rather than 
pass on the policy rate changes to borrowers. In the more developed emerging market 
economies, such as South Africa, there is typically a close link between the policy rates and 
lending rates. But while the link was still present, the spread between the policy rate and the 
lending rates increased due to general risk aversion strategies practiced by the banks. In 
Egypt, the response in lending rates to a reduction in the policy rate was also modest. In 
several frontier market economies, lending rates also lagged the decline in the policy rate. 
For instance, at several banks in Zambia, the lower policy rate did not pass through to 
lending rates (Fundanga (2009)). The link was weakest when policy rates were reduced, 
thereby also lowering the effectiveness of the interest rate channel in providing 
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1  Policy rates are from line 60 in the IMF‘s IFS.    
2  Weighted by GDP. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Fixed exchange rate countries (members of the CFA franc zone and the rand Common 
Monetary Area) had only a limited opportunity for pursuing an independent monetary policy. 
The BCEAO and the BEAC central banks reduced their policy rates to only a very limited BIS Papers No 56  51
 
 
extent, although there might have been more room for cuts when the European Central Bank  
started to reduce its policy rate. In mid-2009, for example, the ECB reduced its lending rate 
by 200 basis points, while the BEAC responded with a 50 basis point reduction (Wakeman-
Linn et al (2009)). 
Credit channel 
Bank lending to the private sector had been expanding rapidly in many African countries 
before the crisis. The annual growth rate reached some 20–55% in half the cases, although it 
was more modest in the fixed rate CFA franc zone (for example about 7% in Cameroon and 
14% in Senegal) (Table 5). The growth was fuelled in part by large capital inflows and by a 
monetary policy that in some cases was too accommodative to stem rising inflation (apart 
from that induced by rising food and oil prices).  
 
Table 5 
Growth of bank credit to the private sector in selected African countries 
Year-on-year growth rates, in per cent, period averages
1 
  January 2005–
September 2008 
September 2008– 
April 2009  April 2009–latest
2 
Emerging market     
Algeria               20.7               16.2                15.5  
Egypt                 9.1                 9.3                  3.0  
Morocco               18.3               18.2                10.0  
South Africa               20.8                 9.2                  2.9  
Tunisia                 8.9               14.6                13.4  
Frontier market     
Botswana               19.2               22.7                11.3  
Cape Verde               22.0               23.7                11.2  
Ghana               46.4               46.3    
Kenya               15.5               24.4                15.8  
Mauritius               13.9               20.0                  5.6  
Mozambique               28.5               56.9                48.8  
Namibia               14.7                 9.4                  9.3  
Nigeria               54.4               37.9                18.6  
Seychelles               15.0               32.5                  9.5  
Tanzania               32.9               26.9                16.1  
Uganda               26.0               43.5                21.2  
Zambia               40.3               42.3                 –0.4 
Selected financially 
developing 
   
Angola               72.7               60.2                53.2  
Cameroon                7.1               16.2                  9.1  
Congo, Dem Rep of               13.3               66.0                31.9  
Ethiopia               31.9               37.5    
Lesotho               30.8               19.4                21.4  
Madagascar               24.1               17.6                  9.4  
Senegal               14.4               13.6                  4.8  
Swaziland               25.0                 3.7                  6.8  
Malawi               38.7              106.0                56.3  
1  Calculated from end-of-quarter claims on the private sector.    
2  Q3 2010 if available. 
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In the case of Nigeria, bank lending before the crisis grew at the expense of loan quality – 
annual growth rates of credit exceeded 50% during first quarter of 2005 and the third quarter 
of 2008 (World Bank (2010)). The crisis put a brake on bank lending in several countries, 
particularly those in the rand area. The emerging market economies in North Africa 
continued the modest rates of expansion, with some slowdown in Egypt and Morocco in the 
most recent period. 
Buoyant credit growth to the private sector has raised prudential concerns, since many 
countries do not confer legal rights whereby credit reference bureaus can pool information on 
borrowers and creditors can foreclose on defaulters (Kasekende and Brownbridge (2010)).  
Asset price channel 
Underdeveloped financial markets have an important impact on the effectiveness of 
monetary instruments. In particular, changes in policy interest rates might not affect the 
economy at large if interbank markets are weak or bond and treasury bill markets shallow. 
For example, the development of markets for securities enhances the flexibility of lending 
rates (Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)). In the low-income countries, bond markets are still in 
the early stages of development and are dominated by short-term government bonds. 
Corporate debt markets are largely non-existent except in the emerging market economies. 
Interbank markets are also weak. While the financial sector in Africa, in particular in the low-
income countries, has been among the least developed in the world, important changes have 
taken place to deepen the markets during the past decade.  
In the years before the global financial crisis, international investors showed increasing 
interest in local currency bond markets in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia. They sought 
diversification of risks and high yields when the exchange rates of the local currencies in 
Africa were relatively stable. Some of these factors have changed.  
Fuelled by easing monetary conditions, the local currency bond yields are no longer as 
attractive, especially considering the required risk premium. In addition, the higher variability 
in exchange rates has increased the risk of investment in African securities. Moreover, the 
markets remain shallow and secondary markets almost non-existent because the base of 
institutional investors (eg pension funds and insurance companies) in African countries is still 
weak. This entails costs in terms of exiting the market. The degree to which the global 
financial crisis damaged the nascent financial markets in Africa remains to be seen. There 
are signs that foreign investors are coming back to African markets, although it is still too 
early to tell whether the inflows will be at the same level as before.   
Some of the frontier market economies with relatively developed financial markets have 
taken several measures to deepen the local markets. In Kenya, the government during 2010 
executed four large bond issues to finance infrastructure at maturities of up to 25 years, 
which is highly unusual in Sub-Saharan Africa. In early 2011, the Central Bank of Kenya 
auctioned a 30-year development bond, the longest maturity ever issued in Kenya. In 
addition, the East African Community (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) has 
started to harmonise capital market regulations to ease the movement of capital among the 
EAC member countries. The work includes creation of a single stock exchange for the region 
and common regulatory and accounting frameworks (Business Daily (2011)). In the short 
term, the best prospect for African countries might be to develop their local currency markets 
through a broadening in the domestic investor base.  
The exchange rate channel 
The exchange rate channel is particularly important in small open economies with a flexible 
exchange rate. A monetary expansion would tend to reduce the real interest rate and lead to 
a depreciation of the currency, which would increase exports, reduce imports and thereby 
boost aggregate demand. A depreciation is also likely to raise domestic inflation in the short 
term by raising import prices. This impact is often accentuated through expectations about 
inflation, as the exchange rate is a visible real-time indicator of financial conditions. This is BIS Papers No 56  53
 
 
particularly the case in countries with few timely statistics and information available to the 
general public about the health of the economy. In such countries, the exchange rate is often 
an early indicator of the monetary conditions and inflationary pressures in the economy.  
The exchange rate is also an additional instrument for central banks. In the words of Stanley 
Fischer, “I see the instrument of intervention in the foreign exchange market as in effect 
giving the central bank an extra instrument (or at least an extra half instrument) of policy, 
which enables it not only to target inflation but also to have some influence on the behaviour 
of the exchange rate” (Fischer (2011)). 
Responses to a BIS questionnaire suggest that, for Mauritius, the exchange rate channel is 
the most important channel for transmission of monetary policy (Table 4). It is considered the 
second most important transmission channel in Kenya and among the most important ones 
in South Africa (as important as the asset price channel). 
Table 6 
Volatility of African countries’ exchange rates
1 






Against the US dollar      
Emerging market      
Algeria 0.65  0.75  0.30 
Egypt 0.08  0.17  0.13 
Morocco 0.38  0.89 0.53 
South Africa  1.07  3.28  1.17 
Tunisia 0.35  0.84  0.53 
Frontier market       
Botswana 0.48  0.64  0.36 
Cape Verde  0.50  1.23  0.60 
Kenya 0.38  0.65  0.34 
Mauritius 0.32 1.24  0.92 
Mozambique 0.99  0.83  1.06 
Namibia 1.07  3.28 1.17 
Ghana 0.33  0.45  0.39 
Nigeria 0.18  0.55  0.33 
Seychelles 0.69  3.86  1.80 
Tanzania 0.58 1.07  0.54 
Uganda 0.37  0.86 0.59 
Zambia 0.78  1.54  0.75 
Selected financially developing    
Angola 0.08  0.12  0.16 
Congo, Dem Rep of  0.56  1.55  0.77 
Ethiopia 0.10  0.22 0.30 
Lesotho 1.07  3.28 1.17 
Madagascar 0.27  0.00  0.21 
Malawi 0.27  0.00  0.21 
Swaziland 1.07  3.28  1.17 
Against the euro      
Algeria 0.70  1.04  0.56 
Egypt 0.42  0.98  0.59 
Morocco 0.13  0.38  0.18 
South Africa  0.95  2.69  1.02 
Tunisia 0.21  0.54  0.30 
1  Unweighted average of five-day moving standard deviation of exchange rates.     
Source: Bloomberg; BIS calculations.   54  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
How has the exchange rate regime helped countries manage the effects of the global 
financial crisis? Most central banks allowed greater variability in the exchange rate during the 
crisis (September 2008–April 2009) than in the preceding period (Table 6). A few countries 
(eg Nigeria) tried initially to resist the downward pressure on the currency, in part because 
depreciation made it more difficult to achieve the inflation objective. Eventually, however, in 
the cases where the balance of payments pressure mounted, central banks let the exchange 
rate go. This helped protect the level of reserves, and there were no major losses (Graph 9). 
Interestingly, the countries with flexible exchange rate regimes seem to have had larger 
movements in their reserves than the fixed exchange rate countries. This might be explained 
by the fact that several so-called flexible exchange rate countries have in practice tried to 
stabilise the exchange rate, which has led to a decline in reserves. The exchange rate 
fluctuated quite dramatically in some countries. For example, in Zambia, the kwacha 
depreciated by 38% against the US dollar between mid-2008 and mid-2009.   
In general, the deceleration in growth was smaller for the floating exchange rate countries. 
The fixed exchange rates helped contain the inflationary pressures, as could be expected, 
but they also made the deterioration of the external current account balance worse than for 
the floating exchange rate countries. The crisis was weathered best by countries that allowed 
currency depreciation.  
 
Graph 9 
Growth of foreign exchange reserves
1  
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1  Weighted by GDP. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
The expectations channel 
Expectations of changes in interest rates, prices and the exchange rate have an important 
bearing on the effectiveness of monetary policy because they can influence transmission 
through any of the other channels of monetary policy. This is particularly the case when the 
central bank has gained credibility and its actions become predictable, ie, when the central 
bank actively communicates its policy to the public. 
While this is a more recent development of monetary policy, there are indications that it is 
also gaining significance in Africa. In responses to a BIS questionnaire, the central banks in 
the more developed financial centres indicated that the expectations channel was important. 
In South Africa it was considered one of the transmission mechanisms. In Kenya, there are 
indications that the expectations channel is also becoming more significant after the 
introduction of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) market surveys on key economic 
indicators in September 2009. These surveys have improved the signalling of monetary 
policy through enhanced communication with the market. In Mauritius, the expectations 
channel is also believed to have gained in importance, as the decisions of its MPC have BIS Papers No 56  55
 
 
been communicated and explained to the public. The MPC’s assessment of inflation and 
economic growth receives extensive discussion in the media, which could affect wage and 
price setting behaviour in the economy.  
5. Conclusion 
African countries span a highly diverse set of financial and monetary policy circumstances 
ranging from very rudimentary financial systems with limited transmission mechanisms to 
relatively well developed systems and mechanisms. But irrespective of country and monetary 
regime, all central banks in Africa share the objectives of price stability, economic growth and 
financial stability. 
Across the continent, the reductions in fiscal dominance and excess liquidity have tended to 
make monetary policy more effective. What is still missing in many countries is the develop-
ment of financial markets, including efficient interbank markets, securities of longer maturities 
to establish yield curves and deeper equity markets. In that regard, financially developing 
economies in Africa lag behind low-income countries in other regions, including Asia. 
Unfortunately, the global financial crisis was a setback for many frontier market economies 
that had begun to build up local currency debt markets. But this was the risk of relying mainly 
on a foreign investor base. On the positive side, the setback might also have been a wake-up 
call for policymakers to examine whether all the prudential conditions for development of 
such markets were in place. And policymakers in Africa have to prepare for greater reliance 
on private capital flows.  
During the global financial crisis, policymakers used monetary policy actively to counter the 
recessionary impact of the collapse in demand from abroad. The crisis also demonstrated 
the importance of the initial economic conditions. Countries that had policy space in terms of 
both fiscal and monetary conditions, were in a better position than others to pursue 
countercyclical policies. For countries that had large fiscal and external imbalances, 
however, the initial weaknesses were intensified, and the banking systems suffered 
additional losses in terms of nonperforming loans. In some cases, it was a challenge to shift 
quickly from a tight monetary policy following the food price shock to the easing of monetary 
policy during the global recession. It showed the importance of a forward-looking monetary 
policy. 
While the global financial crisis is ebbing, other exogenous shocks are again hitting Africa, as 
well as the rest of the world.
7 Prices for food and oil are again rising as of the beginning of 
2011, which poses dilemmas for monetary policy. To the extent that these shocks reflect 
temporary declines in the terms of trade for food and oil importers, monetary policy might 
accommodate the initial impact of the shocks. The challenge is to not accommodate any 
secondary impact on prices from these price adjustments so that inflation will again come 
down. This is particularly difficult for countries with a recent history of high rates of inflation 
because price increases in those cases can quickly fuel inflationary expectations.  
The oil price increases of 2008 might be a poor predictor of the required policy response for 
the current oil price increase – the oil price came down quickly in 2009 because of the global 
recession and therefore had a transitory effect on inflation. If oil prices remain high in a 
different cyclical setting, the appropriate stance of monetary policy might have to be 
somewhat tighter than in 2009. 
As to whether monetary policy is inherently different in Africa, its essential features, goals 
and needs are similar to those in other regions of the world: the objectives of supporting low 
inflation and economic growth and financial stability; the need for central bank independence 
                                                  
7   The latest IMF forecasts for Africa are summarised in Appendix Table A2. 56  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
from the government to pursue monetary policy free of political interference; the importance 
of sound public finances for the effectiveness of monetary policy; the key transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy; and, importantly, the need for credibility of the central bank 
in pursuit of monetary policy, both domestically and internationally. And like other developing 
regions, it faces structural changes, which render the demand for money unstable and make 
monetary policy implementation difficult. What is different about Africa is the state of its 
information and statistics, which impedes timely and accurate economic analysis; the poor 
enforceability of contracts; the shallow financial markets that undermine the effectiveness of 
monetary policy; and the high exposure of the African economies to exogenous shocks  
Finally, and importantly, central banks always need to be aware that the short track record 
most of them have had in achieving low inflation will continue to test their credibility and limit 





African countries, by level of financial depth  
  Fixed exchange 
rate 
Flexible/managed 
exchange rates  Oil exporters 
Emerging market economies (5)     
Algeria   X  X 
Egypt   X  
Morocco X     
South  Africa   X  
Tunisia   X  
Frontier market economies (12)
1      
Botswana  X (currency basket)
2   
Cape Verde  X (euro)     
Ghana   X  
Kenya   X  
Mauritius   X  
Mozambique   X  
Namibia X  (CMA)     
Nigeria   X  X 
Seychelles   X  
Tanzania   X  
Uganda   X  
Zambia   X  
Financially developing 
economies (36)     
Angola   X  X 
Benin  X (CFA franc)     
Burkina Faso  X (CFA franc)     
Burundi   X  
Central African Republic  X (CFA franc)     
Cameroon  X (CFA franc)    X 
Chad  X (CFA franc)    X 
Comoros X  (euro)     
Congo, Democratic Republic of    X   
Congo, Republic of  X (CFA franc)    X 
Djibouti  X (US dollar)     
Eritrea  X (US dollar)     
Equatorial Guinea  X (CFA franc)    X 
Ethiopia   X  
Gabon  X (CFA franc)    X 
The  Gambia   X  
Guinea   X  
Guinea-Bissau  X (CFA franc)     
Ivory Coast  X (CFA franc)     
Lesotho X  (CMA)     
Liberia   X  58  BIS Papers No 56
 
 
Table A1 (cont) 
African countries, by level of financial depth  
  Fixed exchange 
rate 
Flexible/managed 
exchange rates  Oil exporters 
Libya X  (SDR)    X 
Madagascar   X   
Malawi   X   
Mali  X (CFA franc)     
Mauritania   X   
Niger  X (CFA franc)     
Rwanda   X   
São Tome & Principe  X (euro)     
Senegal  X (CFA franc)     
Sierra Leone    X   
Somalia   X   
Sudan   X  X 
Swaziland X  (CMA)     
Togo  X (CFA franc)     
Zimbabwe  No separate legal tender – US dollar is the principal currency  
1  Countries that have either tapped international capital markets or have attracted foreign investors into local 
currency markets. The selection criteria include bank assets to GDP and the degree of capital market 
development (see IMF (2009)).    
2  Botswana has a crawling peg to a basket comprising the currencies of the 
SDR and the South African rand, which is adjusted to the prospective rate of inflation in the countries of the 
basket.  




The outlook for Africa in 2011 
Real GDP  Inflation
1 Current  account
2 
 
2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
North  Africa  3.8 2.5 5.4 5.9  –0.4 0.4 
Algeria  3.3 3.6 4.3 5.0 9.4  17.8 
Egypt  5.1  1.0 11.7 11.5 –2.0 –2.7 
Morocco  3.2 3.9 1.0 2.9  –4.2  –5.7 
Tunisia  3.7 1.3 4.4 4.0  –4.8  –7.8 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  5.0 5.5 7.5 7.8  –2.4 0.4 
Angola  1.6  7.8 14.5 14.6 –1.8  6.2 
Botswana  8.6 6.0 7.0 7.8  –2.5  –2.4 
Congo, Dem Rep of 7.2  6.5  23.5  12.0  –6.8  –2.8 
Ethiopia  8.0  8.5  2.8 12.9 –4.3 –8.1 
Ghana  5.7 13.7 10.7  8.7 –7.2 –6.8 
Ivory  Coast  2.6  –7.5 1.4 5.0 3.9  … 
Kenya  5.0 5.7 3.9 7.2  –7.9  –9.3 
Lesotho  2.4 3.1 3.8 5.4  –16.2  –23.4 
Madagascar –2.0  0.6  9.0 8.9  –13.4  –7.1 
Malawi  6.6 6.1 6.9 6.6  –1.3  –3.8 
Mauritius  4.0 4.1 2.9 7.4  –9.5  –11.6 
Mozambique  7.0  7.5  12.7  9.5 –12.7 –12.0 
Namibia  4.4 4.8 4.5 5.9  –1.1  –0.9 
Nigeria  8.4  6.9 13.7 11.1  6.4 14.6 
Senegal  4.2 4.5 1.2 3.9  –8.3  –11.5 
Seychelles  6.2  4.0  –2.4  3.1 –50.7 –32.7 
South Africa  2.8  3.5 4.3 4.9  –2.8  –4.4 
Swaziland  2.0 0.5 4.5 7.9  –20.6  –16.0 
Tanzania  6.5  6.4 10.5  6.3 –8.6 –9.5 
Uganda  5.2 6.0 9.4 6.1  –9.9  –10.6 
Zambia  7.6 6.8 8.5 9.0 3.8 5.9 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2010. 
1  Changes in annual averages.     
2  As a percentage of GDP.   
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